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Introduction
The impact of broadband access regulations on competition and investment is a crucial issue, whose consequences are increasing with the rise of Next Generation Access Networks (NGN). The tension between promoting competition and investment incentives has already been noted in economics literature. Laffont and Tirole, (2000) underline the trade-off between promoting competition, which increases social welfare once infrastructure is in place, and investment incentives, which are used to improve or simply maintain the infrastructure. Kalmus and Wiethaus, (2007) have developed a model which describes the impact of access charges in different regulatory regimes. Like Laffont and Tirole, they distinguish between infrastructures which are already in place and investments in new infrastructures, or upgrading existing infrastructures. In the case of existing infrastructures, they concluded that an access charge set at cost is the best way to maximize social welfare. For new infrastructures or upgrades, on the other hand, they concluded that an access charge set at cost is inefficient. The optimal access charge is higher than marginal costs. In the first case, investments are not needed. The regulator simply maximizes the static efficiency of the infrastructure. In the second case, however, investments are needed and operators, including both existing operators and their rivals, must be encouraged to invest. A low access charge does not provide enough returns to investors and allows competitors to obtain access at low costs. They have also shown that investments and consumer surplus both increased with access charge. More recently, Nitsche and Wiethaud (2010) have focused on the specific case of investments in NGNs. They concluded that the best regime was the "Fully Distributed Costs" (FDC) system, which maximizes the consumer surplus and "Risk sharing" in order to maximize investment. These regulatory regimes are more efficient than a simple access charge set at cost, known as the "Long Run Incremental Cost" (LRIC) system. In recent decades, regulatory regimes, particularly in Europe, have been more focused on promoting competition than on investment incentives, in line with the "ladder of investment" theory of (Cave, 2006) . Kalmus and Wiethaus (2007) This behavior has clearly made it possible to shake off competition from state owned monopolies, but the ladder of investment theory's efficiency has been called into question. A paper (Bourreau, Dogan, & Manant, 2009 ) noted that competitors seem to be stuck on the first rungs of the ladder of investment. A growing current of thought, particularly in the USA, emphasizes the investment side and the overall dynamic effects of regulatory regimes. Bauer and Bohlin (2008) have observed a trend which moves from static to dynamic regulation. This new regulatory behavior is explained by the need to boost investments in order to upgrade the existing copper infrastructure. Empirical studies highlight the impact of access charge regulation on investments. Waverman, Meschi, Reillier, and Dasgupta (2007) have shown that a low copper access charge encouraged intra-platform competition (DSL competition only) but hampered inter-platform competition (competition among DSL and cable or FTTx operators) and hence investment. They argue that, in the long run, its negative effects on inter-platform investment override its beneficial effects on intra-platform competition. As Kalmus et al. have observed, investment, which allows inter-platform competition, acts over the long term. This is a dynamic effect and its impact depends on the investments effects on consumers' willingness to pay. Jeanjean (2010) highlights that the dynamic effect of investments depends on the potential of technological progress and is inversely proportional to the static efficiency of competition in maximizing welfare. A paper by Brito, Pereira, and Vareda (2010) analyzed the incentives to invest according to the degree of improvement perceived by consumers between an old technology (copper) and a new technology (fiber). If only the incumbent operator can invest, when the improvement is non-drastic it may be induced to give access to the entering operator. Furthermore, when the improvement is small and non-drastic, a duopoly on the retail market is socially optimal, while when the improvement is non-drastic but large, a monopoly on the retail market is socially optimal. In this case the decrease in welfare caused by a decline in the level of competition is smaller than the decrease caused by the high level of the fiber access charge paid by the newcomer. When the improvement is drastic, the incumbent operator does not give access to the newcomer. The solution might be regulating the fiber access charge, but this may deter investments. If both firms can invest, but only one does, it is more likely that the entrant is the one which invests. This paper aims to examine the trade-off between static efficiency, which is the advantage of cost-oriented access charges, and dynamic efficiency, which is the advantage of higher access charge. The paper's originality consists in dealing with intraplatform and inter-platform competition at the same time. It models competition between the incumbent operator, which owns the copper infrastructure, and its rival, which buys access from the incumbent. Both the incumbent and its rival may build a new FTTH infrastructure which allows enhanced services, which in turn increase consumers' willingness to pay. This new infrastructure may or may not be regulated by a fiber access charge. The model investigates both the level of the copper access charge and, if necessary, the fiber access charge. Our investigation is divided into six sections. In section 2, a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly model is introduced (Shaked & Sutton, 1987) . In section 3, we attempt to determine the FTTH investment incentives in FTTH-infrastructure-based competition. The interdependence of investment incentives and access charges in FTTH-service-based competition is demonstrated in section 4. Nationwide FTTH coverage, consumer surplus and social welfare are determined in section 5 and FTTHinfrastructure-based and FTTH-service-based competition are compared. Section contains our concluding remarks.
The linear model
In the following section, a two-player, four-offer model is introduced (Shaked & Sutton, 1987) The two players are a vertically integrated firm -the incumbent which owns the copper network -and its rival. In order to analyze the role of the copper access charge, each operator is able to offer Internet access through either technology, but only the copper access charge is regulated. The incumbent manages the copper infrastructure, provides a copper offer, and possibly a FTTH offer, if it decides to invest. The rival provides a copper offer by paying an access charge to the incumbent and possibly, if it decides to invest, a FTTH offer by investing in a fiber infrastructure.
We assume that the consumer's utility to be connected to the network, whatever the technology, is V. The fiber network is supposed to provide higher quality than copper. We assume that the difference of utility between copper and fiber isθ . The incumbent incurs a marginal cost c for the copper offer for both the retail and wholesale markets. Both firms incur the same marginal cost f c for the fiber offer.
The two firms are differentiated à la Hotelling, with the transportation cost t. The two technologies are differentiated vertically with the parameter h. We illustrate this in the following figure with two axes of differentiation on a two-dimensional surface. 
When t is high, operators are highly differentiated, when t is low, operators are highly substitutable and competition is fierce. When h is high, the technologies are very vertically differentiated, and consumers see fiber and copper as very different. In other words, consumers are segmented (or distributed) according their access technology preference. When h is low, consumers all have a tendency to adopt the same behavior.
Two cases are particularly relevant to understanding the impact of access charges on investment incentives. The first case is 0 = h . In this case, consumers all adopt the same behavior, and will all choose a fiber offer as soon as it is available because of the premium θ it provides.
The second case is 0 = t , a perfect competition between firms.
In this study, we distinguish between two types of competition for FTTH offers:
• FTTH-infrastructure-based competition, only the FTTH network owner can propose FTTH offers • FTTH-service-based competition, the FTTH network owner can or must offer wholesale FTTH access to competitors through a FTTH access charge FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH----infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure----based competition based competition based competition based competition
Given that the copper access charge provides revenues for the incumbent and generates costs for the rival, profits expressions are as follow (in case of both firms invest in FTTH)
Where The profit expressions differ depending on which player invests in FTTH. If the incumbent invests in FTTH and the rival proposes an FTTH offer by paying an FTTH access charge to the incumbent, the profit expressions become:
Where a a a a f f f f : FTTH access charge
If the rival invests in FTTH and the incumbent proposes an FTTH offer by paying an FTTH access charge to the rival, the profit expressions become: Table  Table Table  Table 1  1 1  1 Payoff table for  Payoff table for  Payoff table for  Payoff table for . This expression means that the incumbent and the rival are both encouraged to invest when the other is investing.
In the same manner, we are able to determine the FTTH investment strategy based on the actions and reactions of both firms in the four situations described above. We will call this maximum amount of investment Table  Table Table  Table 2 2 . This expression means that the incumbent's investment action is confirmed and the rival's reaction is absent, meaning that the incumbent invests alone. This is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the regulator sets the copper access charge c a . In the second stage, both players decide whether to invest in the fiber infrastructure. In the third stage, players compete on the retail price of copper and possibly fiber. The game is studied for a given area, with a given fixed FTTH infrastructure cost f f f f, which is assumed to be equal for both firms. As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. By comparing each player's profits, with and without fiber investment, we are able to determine fiber investment incentives.
II

Model resolution in FTTH-infrastructure-based competition
Three cases are studied in this section. Subsection 3.1 analyses the case where copper and FTTH are seen as fully substitutable technologies with h=0. Subsection 3.2 analyses a perfect competition with t=0. Subsection 3.3 analyses imperfect competition in a segmented market with t > 0 and h > 0. The latter case is a generic case where we use numerical simulation to solve the model.
Fully substitutable technologies h=0
In this case, the utility functions in equation (2-1) can be rewritten as follow:
The equilibrium may be different depending on whether the incumbent or the rival invests or both invest.
No firm invests
In this case, fiber offers are not available, consumers can choose only between the incumbent and rival's copper offers. Market share is written: A first order condition allows us to determine equilibrium prices:
and profits at equilibrium:
We can observe that the rival's profit does not depend on copper access charge because the rival can pass along the price burden and preserve its margin without reducing its market share. This is not possible when at least one fiber offer is available.
An increase in access charge increases the incumbent's profit and has no effect on the rival's profit.
. This reduces the incumbent's incentive to invest when access charge increases.
Only the incumbent invests
In this case, the incumbent's consumers all choose the fiber offer while the rival's consumers all choose the copper offer. While all of its consumers have migrated towards fiber, the incumbent continues to receive revenues from the wholesale market. (  ( (  (3 3 3 3----7 7 7 7) ) ) )
Let us denote
which represents the benefits of fiber as compared to copper. This is the marginal cost difference plus the consumers' utility difference. In order to ensure that the market is fully covered we assume
A first order condition leads to equilibrium prices:
And profits at equilibrium: (3 3 3 3----9 9 9 9) ) ) )
Only the rival invests
In this case, the rival's consumers all choose the fiber offer while the incumbent's consumers all choose the copper offer. The incumbent thus no longer receives revenues from the wholesale market. (3 3 3 3----13 13 13 13) ) ) )
An increase in access charge has no effect either on either firm.
Both firms invest
In this case, consumers all choose the fiber offer, no matter which firm they choose, and as in the previous case, the incumbent receives no revenues from the wholesale market.
Market shares and profits are written: A first order condition leads to equilibrium prices:
And profits at equilibrium: (3 3 3 3----17 17 17 17) ) ) )
An increase in access charge has no effect on either firm. It is interesting to note that despite the increase in consumer utility provided by fiber, the incumbent's profits are lower than in the case where neither firm invests, while the rival's profits are the same. Table  Table Table  Table 3 3 3 3 Market share 
Investment Incentives
The following payoff Ta  Table ble ble  ble 4  4 4  4 payoff table for  payoff table for  payoff table for  payoff table for The investment incentive is the difference between profits after investment and profits before investment. For a given area, we assume the fixed cost of investment is the same for both firms: f f f f. The denser the area, the lower the fixed FTTH cost f f f f.
For a given area, incentives are: The maximum amount that a firm is encouraged to invest corresponds to the least dense area the firm is willing to cover. By using (  ( (  (3 3 3  3----18 18 18 18) ) ) )
We can observe that the access charge does not appear in equation (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) . This means that investment incentives are independent of access charge. In this case, the access charge plays no role in the investment incentives. We can also observe that, in this case, the firms have exactly the same incentives whether they invest alone or they both invest. Finally, there are two thresholds of investment: a threshold under which both firms invest and one above which neither firm invests. As a function of copper access charge and fixed FTTH cost, the lefthand region plot above indicates:
In the densest areas where If only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the right region plot above indicates that incumbent's investment incentives are not sensitive to copper access charge. 
NN NN NN NN
Discussion
Why do the access charge not play a role in the investment incentives? If 0 = h , the wholesale market disappears when the rival invests, while it is fully preserved otherwise. This is why the access charge is fully preserved in We can infer that this will no longer be the case if 0 > h . In next section, we will see that the rival's incentive to invest alone increases with the access charge, while the incumbent's incentive remains steady.
What happens if regulator orders the firm which has invested alone to provide access to its competitor with a fiber access charge f a ? In next section, we will see that it will reduce the profits of the firm which has invested and thus reduce its investment incentives.
Perfect competition t=0
In this case, the utility functions in equation (2-1) can be rewritten: The equilibrium may differ depending on whether the incumbent or the rival invests or both invest.
No firm invests
In this case, equation (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) The rival earns no profits and the incumbent earns the difference between the access charge and the marginal cost.
Only the incumbent invests
In this case, equation (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) and perfect competition lead to In this case, fiber enables the incumbent to increase its profits. As only the incumbent has invested, it has the monopoly on fiber, which decreases competition. The incumbent can set its fiber price above marginal cost and thus increase its profits on fiber while maintaining the profits provided by access charges on copper. It is interesting to note that the incumbent maintains the profit provided by access charges not only for copper but also for fiber, because of the expression ) ( c a c − for its fiber price. The incumbent thus fully maintains its profits generated by access charges and can increase its profits from copper. The rival does not benefit from fiber and cannot increase its profits.
Only the rival invests
In this case, equation (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) and perfect competition again lead to A first order condition leads to:
We assume that Only the rival has invested, so it has a monopoly on fiber , which alleviates competition. The rival can set its fiber price above marginal cost and thus increase its profits on fiber. Its profits on copper remain nil. The copper market share decreases, reducing the incumbent's profits generated by access charges. It is relevant to note that the rival has captured part of the profits generated by the access charges.
Both firms invest
In this case, perfect competition requires that the firm set prices at marginal cost for fiber and copper access charges, as in subsection 3.2.1. Since both firms have invested, there is also perfect competition on fiber, which no longer alleviates competition as in subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. A first order condition thus leads to equilibrium prices The rival earns no profits. The access charge generate profits for the incumbent, which are not only proportional to the difference between the access charge and the marginal cost of copper marginal ) ( c a c − , as in subsection 3.2.1, but are also proportional to the copper market share. In this case, however, the introduction of fiber reduces the copper market share, thus reducing the incumbent's profit as compared to when neither firm invests (subsection 3.2.1).
Investment incentives
The following payoff Table  Table Table  Table 5  5 5  5 Payoff table for  Payoff table for  Payoff table for  Payoff table for As in subsection 3.1.5, the investment incentives for a given area are: f is negative. This means that the incumbent is better off when the rival invests alone than when both firms invest. The market share of copper is larger when the rival invests alone than when both firms invest, and in both cases the incumbent's profits are generated by the access charges and thus depend on the market share of copper. The incumbent's investment incentives alone do not depend on the access charge because, as we saw in subsection 3.2.2, the incumbent maintains its part of the profits they generate.
The area where neither firm invests thus decrease with the access charge, while the area where only the rival invests increases with the access charge and there is no area where both firms invest because neither the incumbent nor the rival is interested in investing when their competitor invests. The lefthand region plot above represents the areas where neither firm invests (NN NN NN  NN) ) ) ), only Incumbent invests (IN IN IN  IN) ) ) ), only Rival invests (IN IN IN  IN) ) ) ) or both firms invest (II II II II) ) ) ) as a function of the copper access charge and fixed FTTH costs.
When only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the righthand region plot above shows that the incumbent's investment incentives are not sensitive to the copper access charge.
The marginal social surplus generated by fiber, represented by the parameterω , increases fiber coverage. The vertical differentiation parameter, h, tends to increase coverage when In situation NI NI NI NI, the rival's FTTH profits increase with the access charge, while the rival's copper profits are stable. Unlike the situation where t = 0 when copper offers are set at its marginal cost, the rival takes advantage of its monopoly on fiber. The prices and profits for the rival's fiber are therefore high. In situation II, II, II, II, the incumbent's copper profits and the incumbent and rival's FTTH profits increase with the access charge. However, the rival's copper profits decrease with the access charge.
Nash equilibrium to determine FTTH investment incentives
In this subsection, the results of the previous subsection are summarized in a payoff It is clear that the two situations which correspond to "Incumbent invests in FTTH and Rival does not (" IN IN IN  IN" ) an "the incumbent does not invest in FTTH and the rival does ("NI NI NI NI") are not dominant investment strategies for f=0. One of the two players sees its profit fall when its competitor invests in FTTH. The "II II II II" situation where the incumbent and its rival both invest in FTTH, is the dominant investment strategy in this game: both see their profits increase provided that the fixed FTTH deployment cost is not too high. In other words, the reasoning above is valid for areas where FTTH deployment is naturally profitable. An equilibrium with or without FTTH investment mainly depends on two parameters: the fixed FTTH deployment cost and copper access charge. The lefthand region plot above indicates the following as a function of copper access charge and fixed FTTH cost:
II" is located in low f areas and is almost independent of c a : when f is low enough, both firms invest.
IN" is located in higher f areas and is almost independent of c a : The incumbent invests in FTTH only if FTTH is exclusively reserved for its use.
• "NI NI NI NI" is located in higher f areas and increases with c a . A higher copper access charge encourages the rival to invest in FTTH • "NN NN NN NN" is located in the highest f areas: when f is too high, nobody invests in FTTH When only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the righthand region plot above shows that the incumbent's investment incentives are not sensitive to copper access charge.
Model resolution in FTTH-service-based competition
When the competition is FTTH-service based, four offers exist on the broadband market the "NI Table  Table Table  Table 6 6 6 6 Equilibrium price table for  Equilibrium price table for  Equilibrium price table for  Equilibrium price table for Table  Table Table  Table 7 7 7 7 Market share at equilibrium for Market share at equilibrium for Market share at equilibrium for Table  Table Table  Table 8 8 
Investment incentives t=0
In this subsection, the results of the payoff table are used to determine the dominant investment strategy for both firms. Table  Table Table  Table 9 9 9 9 Equilibrium price table for  Equilibrium price table for  Equilibrium price table for  Equilibrium price table for da dp da dp Table  Table Table  Table 10 10 10 10 Derivatives of equilibrium prices It can be demonstrated that c ic da dp , c rc da dp , It can also be demonstrated that f ic da dp and f rc da dp are always negative, Table  Table Table  Table 11 11 Table  Table Table  Table 13 13 
Investment incentives
In this subsection, the results of the payoff table are used to determine the dominant investment strategy for both firms. By combining two previous tables and using a Taylor series up to the first order, i.e.
II r II i
= − + = π ω π Table  Table Table  Table 15  15 15  15 Profits table at  Profits table at  Profits table at  Profits table at t>0 ,h>0, t>0 ,h>0, t>0 ,h>0, t>0 ,h>0 , with with with with a a a a c (  ( (  ( FTTH  FTTH FTTH The curve above indicates that the FTTH coverage by the rival in situation "NI NI NI NI" in FTTHinfrastructure-based competition (blue curve) is higher than in FTTH-service-based competition (violet curve). FTTH coverage increases with copper access charge. The curve above indicates that the FTTH coverage increases with FTTH access charge in FTTH-service-based competition.
• The curves on the right show that total social welfare in FTTH-service-based competition is maximized at a level of copper access charge above cost. As a function of copper access charge in x-axis and a function of FTTH access charge in y-axis, the contour plot above shows the following:
• On the left, the contour plot shows that the total consumer surplus in FTTHservice-based competition decreases with copper access charge and is maximized at a level of FTTH access charge which is higher than the marginal cost (c f =9).
• On the right, the contour plot shows that total social welfare in FTTH-servicebased competition is maximized at a level of both copper and FTTH access charge which is higher than their marginal costs (c=9, c f =9).
Conclusion and further research
This study proposes a duopoly model (an incumbent and a rival) based on twodimensional Hotelling method. By using "vertical product differentiation", we analyzed both intra-and inter-platform competition (Copper-Copper competition, FTTH-FTTH competition and copper-FTTH competition). Using the description of the utility function of copper and fiber broadband access, Nash equilibrium can be derived in a game where both firms compete on the prices of copper and fiber access after FTTH investment. The paper's originality consists in integrating intra-platform and interplatform competition into a single model.
This model shows that when consumers are segmented copper access charge has a significant impact on broadband consumers' migration from copper to FTTH access. Lower access charge leads to a lower copper price equilibrium, meaning that consumers are encouraged to remain on copper access. To a certain extent, higher access charge leads to higher equilibrium prices for copper access, which encourages consumers to migrate toward FTTH access.
In FTTH-infrastructure-based competition, where fixed FTTH infrastructure costs are low, both the incumbent and the rival invest. Where fixed costs are higher, the rival or the incumbent invests alone. Finally, where fixed costs are very high, neither firm invests. In areas where only one firm invests, the incumbent may invest alone in FTTH whatever the level of the copper access charge, provided that its FTTH network is not open to competitors, meaning that only the incumbent can propose an FTTH offer. The rival may invest alone in FTTH only with a high copper access charge. In other words, the "NI NI NI NI" area where only the rival invests, increases with copper access charge. Maximum social welfare and FTTH coverage are achieved with copper access charge which are higher than cost. Their value depends on the difference in consumers' willingness to pay and marginal costs between copper and FTTH infrastructures.
In FTTH-service-based competition, the investment incentive for both firms (area "II II II II") is absent if both access charges are regulated at marginal cost level. The "NI NI NI NI" and "IN IN IN IN" areas, where only one firm invests, increase with the FTTH access charge. However, investment incentives are much less sensitive to copper access charge, which do not play an essential role in investment incentives, unlike in FTTH-infrastructure-based competition. In order to maximize FTTH coverage, the consumer surplus and social welfare within FTTH-service-based competition, the optimal level for FTTH access charge should be set above marginal cost. The obligation to open its FTTH network to competitors reduces investment incentives even in areas where only one firm invests. The model determines the link between copper and FTTH access charge in order to maximize nationwide FTTH coverage, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In the long run, coverage seems to be the most important parameter because it is likely to generate more technological progress, which dramatically increases social welfare over time (Jeanjean, 2010 
